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Abstract. In order to keep the data secret, various techniques have
been implemented to encrypt and decrypt the secret data. Cryptogra-
phy is committed to the security of content, i.e. it cannot be restored
with a given ciphertext. Steganography is to hiding the existence of a
communication channel within a stego. However, it has been difficult
to construct a cipher (cypher) that simultaneously satisfy both channel
and content security for secure communication. Inspired by the Cardan
grille, this paper presents a new generative framework for grille cipher. A
digital cardan grille is used for message encryption and decryption. The
ciphertext is directly sampled by a powerful generator without an explicit
cover. Message loss and prior loss are proposed for penalizing message
extraction error and unrealistic ciphertext. Jensen-Shannon Divergence
is introduced as new criteria for channel security. A simple practical
data-driven grille cipher is proposed using semantic image inpainting
and generative adversarial network. Experimental results demonstrate
the promising of the proposed method.
Keywords: Grille cipher · Cryptography · Steganography · Image in-
painting · Generative adversarial network.
1 Introduction
In the history of cryptography, a grille cipher was a technique for encrypting a
plaintext by writing it onto a sheet of paper through a pierced sheet (of paper or
cardboard or similar) [1]. The earliest known description is due to the polymath
Girolamo Cardano, known in French as Je´roˆme Cardan in 1550. His proposal
was for a rectangular stencil allowing single letters, or words to be written,
then later read, through its various apertures. The written fragments of the
plaintext could be further disguised by filling the gaps between the fragments
with anodyne words or letters, as shown in Fig. 1[2]. This variant is also an
example of steganography, as are many of the grille ciphers.
The Cardan grille was invented as a method of secret writing. The word
cryptography became the more familiar term for secret communications from
Fig. 1: A Cardan grille has no fixed pattern [2].
the middle of the 17th century. Earlier, the word steganography was common.
The other general term for secret writing was cipher. Sir Francis Bacon gave
three fundamental conditions for ciphers. Paraphrased, these are[1]:
1. A cipher method should not be difficult to use;
2. It should not be possible for others to recover the plaintext;
3. In some cases, the presence of messages should not be suspected.
It is difficult to fulfil all three conditions simultaneously at that time. There
is a modern distinction between cryptography and steganography. Condition 3
applies to steganography. Bacon meant that a cipher message should, in some
cases, not appear to be a cipher at all. The original Cardan Grille met that aim.
However, the original method is slow and requires literary skill. Above all, any
physical cipher device is subject to loss, theft and seizure; so to lose one grille is
to lose all secret correspondence constructed with that grille. Variations on the
Cardano original, however, were not intended to fulfill condition 3 and generally
failed to meet condition 2 as well.
Unfortunately, design a cipher scheme satisfying all these constrains is still
a difficult problem so far. Cryptography try to converse a readable state to
ciphertext which is apparent nonsense, and steganography try to make the ci-
phertext looks normal so that the presence of messages should not be suspected.
The advantage of steganography over cryptography alone is that the intended
secret message does not attract attention to itself as an object of scrutiny. How-
ever, for a long time, the difficulty of constructing the ordinary letter made
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steganography nearly going to be information modification. These traditional
steganography methods such as [3] and [4], by modifying the cover data to hide
the information, did not strictly satisfy the condition 3, had to struggle against
the steganalysis technique[5].
In this paper, we come back to the road of Cardan, a new generative cipher
framework is proposed. We consider the new cipher as a constrained generation
problem and take advantage of the recent advance in generative modeling. After
a deep generative model,i.e., in our case an adversarial net work, is trained, we
search for an encoding that is “closest”to the perfect ciphertext in latent cipher-
text space. The encoding is then used to construct a ciphertext using generator.
We define “closest” by a message loss to penalizes message extraction error,
and a prior loss to penalizes unrealistic samples. A symmetric key called digital
Cardan grille is used for both encryption and decryption. The realistic sam-
ple generation and key space, theoretically, guaranteed to meet the above three
fundamental conditions. A practical cipher is proposed using image inpainting
which is a particular application in image synthesis. Firstly, the corrupted im-
age is taken as the cover, and the secret information is written to the area that
needs to be remain unchanged with digital Cardan grille. The semantic image
completion is realized by using the generative adversarial network with message
loss and prior loss. The secret message is hidden in the reconstructed image after
completion. The experiments on the image database confirms the promising of
such simple method.
2 Related Work
Considering the respective advantages and disadvantages of steganography and
cryptography, it is naturally to get an idea that combining them would simul-
taneously takes the advantages of steganography and cryptography while avoid
the respective defects. In earlier work, there have been a lot of works apply-
ing this idea and one may refer to [6] and [7], but most of these methods do
the encryption and hiding separately, they encrypt the secret information firstly
and then hide them in the digital media. There has been fundmental work on
provably secure steganography, Cachin [8] introduced an information-theoretic
model for steganography. Hopper etc. [9] have given a theoretical framework
for steganography based on computational security. Le [10] presented ideas for
improving the efficiency of scheme and Backes etc. [11] proposed a modifica-
tion which makes the scheme secure against a more powerful active adversary.
Ahn etc. [12] provided a formal framework for public-key steganography and
to prove that public-key steganography is possible. Song etc. [13] proposed a
method doing encryption and hiding at the same time, organically combining
steganography and cryptography. This protocol is based on the LSB matching
method in steganography and Boolean functions used in cryptography.
In Fridrich’s groundbreaking work of modern steganography [14], stegano-
graphic channel is divided into three categories, cover selection, modification
and synthesis. steganography focus on the conditions 3 as show in above. Cover
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selection method does not modify the cover image, thereby avoiding the threat of
the existing steganalysis technology. This method cannot be applied to practical
applications because of its low payload. Cover modification is the most studied
method so far. In terms of KL divergence as a security measure, it can only
achieve ǫ-security or the perfect security for a certain explicit model. Cover syn-
thesis seems more consistent with the earlier Cardan grille. However, about ten
years ago, this method is only a theoretical conception, rather than a practical
steganography, because it is difficult to obtain multiple samples. With the help
of texture synthesis, [15,16] use the texture sample and a bunch of color points
generated by secret messages to construct dense texture images. [17] improves
the embedding capacity by proportional to the size of the stego texture image.
Qian etc. [18] propose a robust steganography based on texture synthesis. Xue
etc. [19] use marbling, a unique texture synthesis method that allows users to
deliver personalized messages with beautiful, decorative textures for hiding mes-
sage. This kind of texture-based methods are based on the premise that the
cover may not represent the content in real world which is counter-intuitive for
steganography which objective is to maintain the nature content of the cover.
Fortunately, a data-based sampling technique, generative adversarial net-
works (GANs) [20] have become a new research hot spot in artificial intelligence.
Recently, two types of designs have applied adversarial training to cryptographic
and steganographic problems. Abadi [21] used adversarial training to teach two
neural networks to encrypt a short message that fools a discriminator. However,
it is hard to offer an evaluation to show that the encryption scheme is com-
putationally difficult to break. Instead of relying on manual password analysis,
PassGAN[22] uses a GAN to autonomously learn the distribution of real pass-
words from actual password leaks, and to generate high-quality password guesses.
Adversarial training has also been applied to steganography. Volkhonskiy etc.[23]
first propose a new model for generating image-like containers based on Deep
Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks (DCGAN[24]). This approach
allows to generate more setganalysis-secure message embedding using standard
steganography algorithms,they do not measure performance against state-of-
the-art steganographic techniques making it difficult to estimate the robustness
of their scheme.Similar to [23], Shi etc.[25] introduce a new generative adver-
sarial networks to improve convergence speed, the training stability the image
quality. Similar to [21], Hayes [26] define a game between three parties, Alice,
Bob and Eve, in order to simultaneously train both a steganographic algorithm
and a steganalyzer. HoweverAlice is still trained to learn to produce a stegano-
graphic image by LSB which is a traditional cover modification method. Tang
etc.[27] propose an automatic steganographic distortion learning framework us-
ing a generative adversarial network, which is composed of a steganographic
generative subnetwork and a steganalytic discriminative subnetwork. However,
most of these GAN-based steganographic schemes are still the cover modification
techniques. These methods focus on the adversarial game between steganography
and steganalysis while ignoring the core aim of the GAN is to build a powerful
sampler.
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Since GAN’s biggest advantage is to generate samples, it is a intuitive idea
to use GANs generate a semantic cipher from a message directly as the Cardan
did. Some researcher made a preliminary attempt on this intuitive idea. Ke
[28] proposed generative steganography method called GSK in which the secret
messages are generated by a cover image using a generator rather than embedded
into the cover, thus resulting in no modifications in the cover. Liu etc. [29]
propose a method that using ACGANs [30] to classify the generated samples,
and they make the class output information as the secret message. In [31], the
secret message is written to the corrupted area of image that needs to be filled,
then the corrupted stego image is fed into a Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) for stego generation.
The proposed scheme in this paper can be considered as a steganographic
scheme as well as a classical cryptographic scheme, so we call the proposed
scheme a cipher scheme. Different from classical cryptography and cover modi-
fication steganography, ciphertext is sampled by a generator with constrains. In
this paper, our main work is to take advantage of machine learning approach, a
deep generative model by adverserial network, to implemente a classical cryptog-
raphy(cardan grille). The content security of our proposed scheme is equivalent
to classical Cardan grille cipher. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
provide a formal framework for generative cipher and to prove that channel se-
curity is possible. In order to maintain consistency with modern stegonagraphy,
we also use the term stego to denote the ciphertext in this paper. Our generative
cipher can be also considered as a generative steganography. This paper has the
following contributions:
1. We propose a practical data-driven framework call digital Cardan grille
for cipher by learning a generator, ciphertext is directly sampled by a generator.
This framework simplifies the design of cipher. Classical cipher design to a large
extent be automated. It can also be applied to other media, such as text, video
and other fields. This scheme is also a key-dependent steganographic scheme
adhere to Kerckhoffs’s principle.
2. A new criterion for channel security (steganography) is defined. A formal
representation for cipher is proposed which figure out the connection between
steganography and classical cryptography. We also give a toy example of ci-
pher scheme to illustrate the relationship between classical cryptography and
steganography.
3. Compared with texture synthesis methods, semantic image inpainting is
used to ensure the logical rationality of cover contents. Compared with cover
modification steganography, our method make the ciphertext distribution and
real data distribution as close as possible, there is no specific original cover.
Other image synthesis methods [32] based on the generative model can be
easily converted into a cipher scheme using this framework.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows: We detail the formal
representation of cipher in the following section. Section IV show how to con-
struct a cardboard grille ciphers using constrained image generation by GANs.
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Experiment results are demonstrated in Section V. Section VI concludes this
research and details our future work.
3 Framework
The Generative Cipher (steganography) Framework (CCF) of this paper is shown
in Fig. 2 as follows:
Fig. 2: Generative steganography framework.
In this scenario, the sender create a stego carrier from a generator with message
directly. The encryption algorithm actually turns into a cipher generation pro-
cess. The secret key shared by both parties ensures the security of the message,
the natural real degree of stego determines the security of the communication
channel.
In this paper we consider the notion of generative steganography against
adversaries that do not attempt to disrupt the communication between Alice and
Bob (i.e., the goal of the adversary is only to detect whether steganography is
being used and not to disrupt the communication between the participants). We
show that secure cipher exists if any of several assumptions hold. Furthermore,
we introduce a practical scheme that is secure under these assumptions. It is
important to note that the shared key here is indispensable, in the case of active
attack defined in steganography, if the adversary can easily get the key, then the
communication is not safe.
3.1 Perfect Cipher Conditions
In this section, we formalize cipher algorithm. Ideally the cipher scheme should
satisfy the following three fundamental conditions which in line with the idea of
Sir Francis Bacon. We call these perfect cipher conditions, or PCC:
c = E(m, k) (1)
m = D(c, k) (2)
pcipher = preal (3)
where original informationm is known as plaintext, c denotes the encrypted form
as ciphertext. k is the symmetric key shared by two parties. E(.) in condition
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(1) is a encryption algorithm of cipher, and D(.) is the decryption operation.
pcipher and preal denotes the distribution of ciphertext and real data. PCC (1)
and (2) make the framework close to classical cryptography, which was effectively
synonymous with encryption, the conversion of information from a readable state
to apparent nonsense. PCC (3) guarantees the security of communication channel
which is aim of steganography. Therefore, our goal for perfect cipher algorithm
is to find a cryptography that satisfying steganography condition pcipher = preal.
A data-based sampling technique, generative adversarial network (GAN) is
to estimate the potential distribution of existing data and generate new data
samples from the same distribution. If we can learn a powerful generator which
satisfy the PCC (3), together with a classical cryptography, a perfect cipher
solution can be achieved to protect both content and channel of the secret infor-
mation. In this paper, inspired by the intuitive idea, we use generator of GAN
to sample a semantic ciphertext driven by a message directly. We call this gen-
erative cipher or generative stegonoraphgy. In generative cipher, we not only
require the pcipher = preal, but also require the generator to satisfy the request
for message extraction as shown in PCC (2). Therefore, we consider generative
cipher as a constrained ciphertext generation problem and take advantage of the
recent advances in generative modeling.
Interestingly, suppose all these conditions are satisfied, if every ciphertext
sampled from generator is exactly as same as a real data sample. The generator
can be seen as a way to select real samples from the world. This also means that
the generator will be able to construct an infinite real sample database. You can
imagine that the generator is a simulated digital camera, and each sampling is
equivalent to taking a picture from the real world. What’s even more amazing
is that every seemingly normal picture contains a secret message.
3.2 A Measure of Channel Security
In mathematical statistics, the Kullback-Leibler divergence is a measure of how
one probability distribution diverges from a second, expected probability dis-
tribution. Fridrich [14] introduces a formal information theoretic definition of
security in steganography based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
distributions of cover and stego objects:
DKL(pstego || pcover) = Ex∼pcover [log
pstego
pcover
] = Ex∼pcover [log pstego − log pcover]
(4)
where pcover and pstego are the distributions of cover and stego, respectively.
However, KL divergence doesn’t satisfy the symmetric and triangle inequality
conditions, it cannot be strictly considered as a metric. The security of different
steganography cannot be evaluated with this divergence. In this paper, a new
measure of security for steganography is defined by the Jensen-Shannon diver-
gence, which is based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence, with some notable
(and useful) differences, including that it is symmetric and it is always a finite
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value. It is defined by:
DJS(pstego || pcover) =
1
2
D(pstego ||M) +
1
2
D(pcover ||M) (5)
M =
1
2
(pstego + pcover) (6)
The Jensen-Shannon divergence is bounded by 1 for two probability distri-
butions, given that one uses the base 2 logarithm
0 ≤ DJS(pstego || pcover) ≤ 1 (7)
when pstego = Pcover, Jensen-Shannon divergence is zero.
In generative steganography, we can use this metric to evaluate which genera-
tor is closer to the real data distribution. It means that we can sample a security
stego from the best generator. In fact, the generator in generative adversarial
network [20] is trained based on the Jensen-Shannon divergence, the adversarial
game make the divergence between generator distribution pg and data distribu-
tion pdata is gradually reduced with the increasing of adversarial iteration. In
generative steganography, pg, pstego and pfake have the similar meaning, pcover
is pdata . Since in our scheme, there is no explicit cover, we use pdata instead of
pcover.
In [20], Goodfellow etc. train discriminative model D to maximize the prob-
ability of assigning the correct label to both training examples and samples from
G. They simultaneously train G to minimize log(1−D(G(z))). In other words,D
and G play the following two-player minimax game with value function V (G;D):
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1 −D(G(z)))] (8)
The minimax game in Eq. 8 can be reformulated as:
C(G) = Ex∼pdata [log
pdata(x)
pdata(x) + pg(x)
] + Ex∼pg [log
pg(x)
pdata(x) + pg(x)
] (9)
The theorem and proposition are given with their proof in [20] for theoretical
proving the convergence of algorithm.
Theorem 1. The global minimum of the virtual training criterion C(G) is achieved
if and only if pg = pdata. At that point, C(G) achieves the value − log 4.
C(G) = max
D
V (G,D) = − log 4 +DJS(pdata, pg) (10)
Proposition 1. If G and D have enough capacity, the discriminator D is al-
lowed to reach its optimum given G, and pg is updated so as to improve the
criterion :
Ex∼pdata [logD
∗
G(x)] + Ex∼pg [log(1−D
∗
G(x))] (11)
then pg converges to pdata
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In practice, adversarial nets represent a limited family of pg distributions via the
function G(z; θg) and we optimize θg rather than pgitself.
Similar to Fridirich’s ǫ - security steganography, we define a ǫ - security for
generative cipher system based on Jensen-Shannon divergence:
DJS(pcipher, pdata) ≤ ǫ (12)
Ideally, when the generator is optimal, i.e., ǫ = 0, the system can be considered
perfectly safe to statistical analysis in steganalysis. In generative cipher, we not
only require the DJS(pg, pdata) = 0, but we also require the generator to satisfy
the request for message extraction as shown in PPC (2).
3.3 A Generative Perspective
Before the modern era, classical cryptography focused on message confidentiality
(i.e., encryption)conversion of messages from a comprehensible form into an
incomprehensible one and back again at the other end, rendering it unreadable by
interceptors or eavesdroppers without secret knowledge (namely the key needed
for decryption of that message). This procedure can be formalized as follow:
Dec(Enc(m, k), k) = m (13)
Enc(m, k) = argmin
c∼pcipher
DJS(pcipher , puniform) (14)
Dec(c, k) = m (15)
where Enc(.) is a encryption operation. Security of the key used should alone
be sufficient for a good cipher to maintain confidentiality under an attack. This
representation can be considered as a constrained cipher generation problem.
DJS(pcipher , puniform) is the Jensen-Shannon divergence between the cipher’s
distribution and the uniform distribution. Note that, the only difference from
perfect cipher scheme is that it is not intended to fulfill PCC(3). Ciphertexts
produced by a classical cryptography (and some modern ciphers) will reveal
statistical information about the plaintext, and that information can often be
used to break the cipher. The aim of classical cryptography is to tend to flatten
the frequency distribution to the uniform distribution.
Currently, the state-of-the-art methods of cover modification steganography
can be viewed as a constrained coding problem, which minimizing the distortion
between cover and stego with Syndrome Trellis Coding (STC)[4]. The embedding
and extraction mappings are realized using a binary linear code C :
Ext(Emb(x,m)) = m (16)
Emb(x,m) = argmin
y∈C(m)
D(x, y) (17)
Ext(y) = Hy (18)
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where x is cover,m denotes message, y is stego.D(x, y) is the distortion function.
Emb(.) and Ext(.) denotes embedding and extraction operation which also can
be considered as encryption and decryption operations. Embedding processing
is an optimum problem to find a stego y that satisfying the message extraction
condition and minimizing the distortion, simultaneously. The embedding prob-
lem can be optimally solved by the Viterbi algorithm. This implementations of
steganography that lack a shared secret are forms of security through obscurity
which is the reliance on the secrecy of the design or implementation as the main
method of providing security for a system or component of a system. Further-
more, although stego y is highly correlated with specific cover x, a well-trained
classifier that training on data set X and Y is able to perform steganalysis.
Similarly, in this paper, we give a representation of optimization problem for
generative cipher:
Dec(Gen(m, k), k) = m (19)
Gen(m, k) = argmin
c∼pcipher
DJS(pcipher, pdata) (20)
Dec(c, k) = m = Ckc (21)
where Gen(.) is a generator.Dec(.) denotes the decryption operation. Ck is an
extract matrix based on the secret key k. This representation can be considered
as a constrained cipher generation problem. DJS(pcipher, pdata) is the Jensen-
Shannon divergence between the model’s distribution and the data. Note that
our generative steganography is a key-dependent steganographic scheme adhere
to Kerckhoffs’s principle. We will give the details of the Ck with a practical
algorithm in the next section. It is important to note that an explicit cover x
is unnecessary. Stego y does not depend on any specific cover, it is regarded
as sampling from generator distribution pg.The emergence of the generative ad-
versarial network makes the generative cipher scheme will be more and more
attention to how to ensure the accuracy of information extraction.
More specifically, we also formulate the procedure of finding ciphertext y as
an optimization problem. Let m be the message and k be the secret key shared
by two parties. Using this notation we define the closest encoding zˆ via:
zˆ = argmin
z
Lm(z|m, k) + Lp(z) (22)
where Lm denotes the message loss, which constrains the generated ciphertext
given the message m and the extract key k, Lp denotes the prior loss, which
penalizes unrealistic ciphertext. We get generative cipher y = G(zˆ). The details
of the proposed loss function will be discussed with a practical generative cipher
in the section IV.
In our design, in order to minimize the loss function, we first train a gener-
ator, as shown in Fig. 3(a). As section 3.1 discussed, in this paper generator is
constructed by GAN, the training target of GAN is to reach the optimum state
of C(G),In which C⋆ = −log(4) is the global minimum of C(G) in the proposed
scheme. Ideally, it indicates pstego = pdata.
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(a) Training a generator with GAN. (b) Sampling a cipher with constraints.
Fig. 3: Constrained Cipher Generation.
Next, we keep generator fixed to sampling cipher, as shown in Fig. 3(b).
Back-propagation to the input data is introduced to optimize the coding of the
input data z on GAN. The back-propagation based methods require specifically
designed loss function. In this task, we use L1 distance as Lm.
z ← z − ηz∇zL (23)
∇zL = −
∂(Lm + Lp)
∂z
(24)
Similar to [33], we iteratively update z using back-propagation by Eq. (23)-(24).
After enough training iterations, the input data z on GAN would get optimized
to make the loss minimum.
3.4 A Toy Example for Visual Representation
In order to make the difference between stegonography and classical cryptog-
raphy more clearly. In this subsection, we proposed a simple toy cipher with
a simple line on the 2D plane. Suppose that a coordinate point (m, 0) on the
X-axis in the plane coordinate represents a secret information m. The Shared
key k(kx, ky) may be any point on the plane except for points on the X-axis, as
shown in Fig. 4(a). Two points m and k define a unique straight line L(m, k)
as shown in Fig. 4(b). In this case, L can be considered as the simplest gen-
erator. The sender selects a random number, r, then sample a point c(cx, cy)
according to the line, which can be regarded as the corresponding ciphertext,
as shown in Fig. 4(c). It’s easy for receiver to restore the m by intersection of
the L(c, k) and the X-axis as shown in Fig. 4(d). If the ciphertext follow a uni-
form distribution, this cipher (encryption algorithm) is a classical cryptography
shown in Fig. 4(e). If the ciphertext follow a real data distribution, this cipher
(steganography algorithm) is a generative steganography, as shown in Fig. 4(f).
In this simple encryption scheme above, this scheme can only resist low-level
Ciphtext-only attack. While the attacker has no channel providing access to
the plaintext prior to encryption, in all practical ciphertext-only attacks, the
attacker still has some knowledge of the plaintext. Cryptographers developed
11
Fig. 4: A Toy Example.
statistical techniques for attacking ciphertext, such as frequency analysis. Every
modern cipher attempts to provide protection against ciphertext-only attacks.
In the next section, we will present a practical, generated cipher solution with a
powerful generator.
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4 Digital Cardan Grille
A simple practical data-driven cipher method called Digital Cardan Grille is
proposed using semantic image inpainting. To fill missing regions in images,
our method for cipher generation utilizes the generator G and the discrimina-
tor D, both of which are trained with uncorrupted data. After training, the
generator G is able to take a point z drawn from pZ and generate an image
mimicking samples from pdata. Before constructing the practical generative ci-
pher or steganography algorithm, we hypothesize that a generator has already
met DJS(pcipher , pdata) = 0, and then we can focus on how to design a scheme
to ensure that messages extracted correctly. In this paper, the message is writ-
ten to the uncorrupted region that needs to be keep in the corrupted image,
the stability of the message was guaranteed by the generator, the generator stop
updating until the ciphertext (stego image) is natural enough. In our framework,
Fig. 5: The proposed method with Cardan grille.
as illustrated in Fig. 5, the procedure of cipher is in line with the basic idea of
traditional Cardan grille. The sender defines a mask, called Digital Cardan grille,
to determine where the message is hidden, and the secret messages go directly
to these uncorrupted locations of the input image. Then, an image inpainting
method based on GANs is used to finish the image completion. A well-filled
image is transmitted to the recipient through the public channel. The receiver
extracts a secret message using the Cardan grille shared by the two parties in
the reconstructed image. The core of this method is to define generator that not
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only ensure the consistency of the secret messages but also the natural reality
of the ciphertext.
4.1 Message Preprocessing
In this paper, the process of generating ciphertext is decomposed into two steps
to simplify the designing, as shown in Fig. 6. First of all, we define a operation
Exn(.) for message expansion:
m′ = Exn(m) (25)
The secret message m by Cardan grille which is shared by both parties to a new
expanded message m′ subject to follow constrain:
m = Dec(m′, k) (26)
Then, we can get the ciphertext by:
c = Gen(m′, k) (27)
We will show that this simple separation trick makes it easier to build a gener-
ator.
Fig. 6: Flowchart of Message preprocessing.
Firstly, we select the secret input corrupted image Icorrupted, message m,
and Cardan grille Ck. It’s important to note the structure and location of this
Cardan grille in the corrupted image are shared by both parties. Assume that
the size of the corrupt region is a × b, where a = b = 64. Then a Cardan grille
14
with same size is defined as:
Ck =


c11 c12 . . . c1b
...
. . .
...
ca1 ca2 . . . cab

 (28)
where cij ∈ {0, 1},Ck is the symmetric-key that shared by both parties. Ideally,
the Cardan grill is designed to have a a × b bit key, key length would coincide
with the lower-bound on an algorithm’s security. A value of 1 represents the
parts of the region we want to hide message and a value of 0 represents the
parts of the image we cannot write message. Then the message can be written
into the uncorrupted regions of the input image. We get a corrupted image
contains secrete message shown as m′. Note that m = m′ ⊙ Ck, ⊙ denotes the
element-wise product operation. The preprocessing is so important that it will
transform the image completion into generative cipher (steganography). In the
next subsection, we will give the details for the image completion based on the
GANs, which complete the generative cipher procedure.
4.2 Semantic Inpainting for Cipher Generation
As mentioned above, the image completion used for cipher should satisfy two
objectives, one is the rationality of the complete image content, the other is the
stability of the message. In this paper we use the a image inpainting method
which proposed by Yeh [33] based on a Deep Convolutional Generative Adver-
sarial Network (DCGAN).
A binary mask M is used for completion that has values 0 or 1. A value of
1 represents the parts of the image we want to keep and a value of 0 represents
the parts of the image we want to complete. Suppose we’ve found an image from
the generator for some that gives a reasonable reconstruction of the missing
portions. The completed pixels can be added to the original pixels to create the
reconstructed image Ireconstructed:
Ireconstructed =M ⊙m
′ + (1−M)⊙G(z) (29)
It is important to note that cipher generation (semantic inpainting in this
case) is not trying to reconstruct the ground-truth image. The goal is to fill
the hole with realistic content while hiding information. Even the ground-truth
image is one of many possibilities.
In our cipher generation method, three loss functions are defined for searching
zˆ.
Contextual Loss: To keep the same context as the input image, make sure
the known pixel locations in the input image m′ are similar to the pixels in G(z).
We need to penalize G(z) for not creating a similar image for the pixels that we
know about. Formally, we do this by element-wise subtracting the pixels in m′
from G(z) and looking at how much they differ:
Lcontextual(z) = ||M ⊙G(z)−M ⊙m
′ ||1 (30)
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where ||.||1 is the L1-norm. In the ideal case, all of the pixels at known locations
are the same between m′ and G(z). Then G(z)i −m
′
i = 0 for the known pixels
i and thus Lcontextual(z) = 0.
Perceptual Loss: To recover an image that looks real, let’s make sure the
discriminator is properly convinced that the image looks real. We’ll do this with
the same criterion used in training the DCGAN:
Lperceptual(z) = log(1−D(G(z))) (31)
Contextual Loss and Perceptual Loss successfully predict semantic informa-
tion in the missing region and achieve pixel-level photorealism.
Message Loss: The key of using image completion for generative cipher
(steganography) is that the messages extracted by the Cardan mask Ck should
be as stable as possible. The pixel value of the corresponding position of the
generated image is equal to the value of the secret message.
Lmessage(z) = ||Ck ⊙G(z)− Ck ⊙m
′||1 (32)
Similar to contextual Loss, all of the pixels at hiding locations are the same
between m′ and G(z). Then G(z)iCm
′
i = 0 for the known pixels i and thus
Lmessage(z) = 0. We’re finally ready to find zˆ with a combination of the all
these losses:
L(z) = Lcontextual(z) + Lmessage(z) + λLperceptual(z) (33)
zˆ = argmin
z
L(z) (34)
where λ that controls how import the perceptual loss are relative to the message
loss. In a particular case, when Ck = M . Lmessage is the same as Lcontextual .
It is important to note that, M and Ck play a different role in cipher genera-
tion, the size and value of Ck can be different from M . Ck is used for message
encryptionwhile M for image completion.
In practice, for each 8-bit pixel on each layer of color image, we cannot
guarantee that the generator will converge to the model that can successfully
satisfying Lmessage(z) = 0. Intuitively, we believe that the lower bits are affected
by the pixel generation, while the high bit has a higher stability. We define a
bit plane index (BPI = 1,..8.) to indicate the location of the layer where the
message is located. Where, BPI = 1 represents the lowest significant bit (LSB),
and BPI=8 represents the most significant bit(MSB). The element-wise product
is operated on the bit plane level.
4.3 Message Extraction
Message extraction for the receiver’s is simple as shown in Fig. 7, The receiver
will cover the grille directly on the image after reconstruction, and the secret
message of the corresponding position can be obtained. The basic operation is
as follows:
m = Ireconstructed ⊙ Ck (35)
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Fig. 7: Message Extaction using Cardan grille.
5 Experiments
5.1 Datasets and Settings
We implemented our adversarial training scheme on the LFW datasets [34]: a
database of face photographs designed for studying the problem of unconstrained
face recognition,some samples shown in Fig. 8. The data set contains more than
13,000 images of faces collected from the web. We use alignment tool to pre-
process the images to be 64×64, as shown in Fig.5. We used the DCGAN model
architecture from Yeh et al. [33] in this work. I emphasize that we modify Bran-
don Amos’s implementation [35]. 12000 samples are used for training DCGAN.
Our setting of training parameters for image completion is same as the Brandon
Amos’s. The generative model, G, takes a random 100 dimensional vector drawn
from a uniform distribution between [-1; 1] and generates a 64 × 64 × 3 image.
The discriminator model, D, is structured essentially in reverse order. The input
layer is an image of dimension 64 × 64 × 3, followed by a series of convolution
layers where the image dimension is half, and the number of channels is double
the size of the previous layer, and the output layer is a two class softmax. For
training the DCGAN model, we follow the training procedure in [35] and [33] for
optimization. We choose λ = 0.1 in all our experiments. In the cipher generation
stage, we need to find zˆ using back-propagation. We use Adam for optimization
and restrict z to [-1; 1] in each iteration, which we observe to produce more stable
results. We terminate the back-propagation after 1000 of iterations. We use the
identical setting for all testing datasets. The size of grille is fixed as 64×64 which
is same as the size of corrupted image. We intentionally randomize the secret
message on all uncorrupted regions so that the stability of embedded messages
can be given in a quantitative manner.
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Fig. 8: Aligned samples form LFW database.
We test four random pattern masks different shapes of masks: 1) random
pattern masks approximately 20% missing; 2) 50% missing masks (randomly
horizontal or vertical); 3) 90% missing complete random masks.
5.2 Visual Comparison
Our results are shown in Fig. 9, which demonstrate that our method can suc-
cessfully predict the missing content with different random mask. It’s important
to emphasize that, in our experiment, Cardan grille was randomly generated,
and, in all the places that we could write, we wrote the message which is also
randomly generated. It is important to note again that cipher generation is not
trying to reconstruct the ground-truth image. The goal is to finding a realistic
image while encrypt information. Even the ground-truth image is one of many
possibilities.
We also show the completion image generation process in Fig. 10, and the
number of iterations is from 20 to 2000. We sample 8 generative images form
the generator. Note that the we chose some ground-truth images in Fig. 10 fall
out of LFW database. As can be seen from the Fig. 10, the meaningless serious
corrupted image (90% missing) will be transformed into a sample from pg. In
the first few rounds of steps, the visual quality of generator output is low. It
can be seen that the complemented image becomes more real as the number of
iterations increases.
Fig. 11(a) and Fig. 11(b) shows the message loss and perceptual loss of an
image. All images are sampled at 500 iterations from corrupted images with
90% region missing. In Fig. 11(a), in the first few rounds of sampling, the vi-
sual quality of output is low, perceptual loss is high. After approximately 250
steps, perceptual loss makes the generated sample more realistic and natural.
In Fig. 11b, message loss is relatively smooth and stable after 150 steps. This
is mainly due to the fact that we keep message loss have more influence on the
total loss.
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Fig. 9: Message Extaction using Cardan grille.
Fig. 10: For each example, Column 1: Ground-truth image from the dataset.
Column 2: Stego corrupted images with random region missing 90% . Column
3-10 : Samples from the generator as the number of iterations increases.
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(a) Perceptual loss. (b) Message loss.
Fig. 11: The message loss and perceptual loss.
We also present the results of the completion of the same image with different
λ values. It can be seen from Fig. 12, although the gap between the generative
stego images are large at the beginning, the completion ciphertext images tend
to be similar as the number of iterations increases.
Fig. 12: Stego Generation for the same image. For each row, Column 1: Ground-
truth image. Column 2: Stego corrupted images with random missing 90%. Col-
umn 3-10 : Samples as the number of iterations increases.
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5.3 Quantitative Analysis
Efficiency All experiments are performed in TensorFlow [41], on a workstation
with a Titan Xp GPU. We take 13.5 hours for training generator with 12000
images. For cipher generation, 1000 iterations for one image take 26s on average.
We also denote the encryption blowup factor of our scheme as lEN , 1 bit plaintext
will be encrypted into lEN bit ciphertext. Take the experiment in Fig. 12 as
an example, 90% region missing means UncorruptedRate = EmbedingRate =
0.1, the secret message has a size of equal to 64 × 64 × UncorruptedRate bits,
after cipher generation, the corresponding uncompressed ciphertext has a size of
64× 64× 8 bits, the encryption blowup factor is 8/EmbedingRate.
Decryption-error rate Due to the non-convexity of the models in the training
scheme, we cannot guarantee that the generator will converge to the model
that can successfully recover the secret message from the steganographic image
perfectly. Fig. 13 shows the relationship between the error rate of the message
extraction and the number of iterations with different BPI (1-8). As shown in
Fig. 13. We do the message embedding and extraction at different BPI for 1000
images which not belonging to the training set. All ciphertext (stego images in
this case) are sampled at 3000 iterations from corrupted images with 90% region
missing. As expected, the accuracy of message extraction increased with the
increase of BPI. The receiver was able to recover more than 95 % of messages
sent by sender when BPI ≥ 3. Our scheme can perfectly decode the secret
encrypted message from the steganographic image at BPI =8. In the Fig. 14,
the relationship between the average error rate and BPI is given, compare with
our work in [31], the stability of the message extraction is greatly improved.
Security for Channel We steganalyze our digital Cardan grille method using
blind steganalyzer for spatial domain and the ensemble classifier. 686-dimensional
SPAM features [36] and 504-dimensionnal SCRMQ1 features [37] with ensem-
ble classifiers [38] implemented as random forests are used for this experiment.
The decision threshold of each base learner is adjusted to minimize the total
detection error under equal priors on the training set:
PE = min
1
2
(PFA + PMD(PFA)) (36)
where PFA, PMD are the probabilities of false alarms and missed detection, re-
spectively.we adjust the threshold to L/2 as PE is nowadays considered standard
for evaluating the accuracy of steganalyzers in practice.
Different from the traditional steganalyzer for cover modification method, all
1000 stego images and 1000 normal images are generated at 1000 iterations from
corrupted images by the image inpainting. The database was divided randomly
into two halves, one used for training and the other for testing. The performance
is averaged over ten random splits. In Fig. 15, we plot the progress of the testing
error PE as a function of the payloads from 0.1bpp to 0.5bpp (bits per pixel)
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Fig. 13: Error rate of the message extraction for different bit plane.
with BPI = 1 compared with HUGO [39] and HILL [40] which are considered
as advanced steganographic method by minimizing distortion using Syndrome-
Trellis Codes.
From the above experiments, it can be seen that the steganography based on
sampling can resist the statistical analysis of the steganography, this is mainly
due to the fact that, completed stego and normal images can be regarded as
samples from the same distribution pg. The normal cover and stego does not
have a pairwise relationship between the extracted features. As can be seen
from the figure, our method has competitive performance with in the case of low
embedding rate.
Fig.16 shows the average classification error PE achieved with five different
BPI at 0.1bpp with 1000 iterations. As the bit plane index increases, the security
of our method decreases on SCRMQ1 feature. SPAM feature does not work. This
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Fig. 14: Average Error rate of the message extraction.
(a) SPAM features. (b) SCRMQ1 features.
Fig. 15: Steganalyzer error PE for a ensemble classifier using (a) SPAM features
and (b) SCRMQ1 features for five different payloads(0.1 to 0.5 bpp) with HUGO,
HILL and our method.
is mainly because SCRMQ1 is designed for color images, and SPAM is designed
for grayscale images.
We also give the error rate for different iterations. This is shown in the Fig. 17
below. After dozens of iterations, SPAM and SCRMQ1 features maintain consis-
tent performance. Experiments show that the resistance to statistical analysis,
does not mean that the image generation quality is good enough, in fact, with the
increase of the number of iterations, image visual distortion to reduce gradually,
as shown in Fig. 12.
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Fig. 16: Comparison of methods with five different BPI at 0.1bpp.
Fig. 17: Steganalyzer error PE for a ensemble classifier with different iterations
at 0.1bpp with BPI=3.
Security for Content The original Cardan Grille was a literary device for gen-
tlemen’s private correspondence. Any suspicion of its use can lead to discoveries
of hidden messages where no hidden messages exist at all, thus confusing the
cryptanalyst. As in the case of letters/numbers in a random grid, obtaining the
grille itself is a chief goal of the attacker. In our method, the size of digital Cardan
grille isM×N , whereM and N is the size of image. The upper bound key space
is 2M×N , in this our particular case, key space here is 2M×N×UncorrouptedRate
which means that the message only written on the uncorrupted pixels. But all
is not lost if a grille copy can’t be obtained. Frequency analysis will show a dis-
tribution of cipher. The problem, easily stated though less easily accomplished,
24
is to identify the transposition pattern and so decrypt the ciphertext. Posses-
sion of several messages written using the same grille should be avoided. In each
communication, the two parties should jointly consume a certain length of the
key.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, a generative cipher is proposed. The relationship between classical
cryptography and steganography is given. Ciphertext are sampling from a well-
trained generator. Inspired by the idea of Cardan grille, a practical method of
generative cipher is proposed by image completion technology. The results of
the experiment and the experimental results verify the promising of such simple
method. It reduces the sophistication of the steganography design, which allows
researchers in other fields can quickly build a cipher system by this framework.
However, the generator in adversarial network is actually in its infancy. In
this paper, we use a simple DCGAN to synthesis natural images. We will focus
on more powerful generator which automatic synthesis of realistic images to
generate more realistic images. The quality of the generated images does not
have a quantitative evaluation standard. It is necessary to continually refine the
performance of the generator to ensure that the security of generative cipher.
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